Providing for Victim Redress within the Legislative Scheme for Tackling Foreign Corruption by Harrington, Joanna
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 43 Issue 1 Article 11 
2020 
Providing for Victim Redress within the Legislative Scheme for 
Tackling Foreign Corruption 
Joanna Harrington 
University of Alberta, Faculty of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Joanna Harrington, "Providing for Victim Redress within the Legislative Scheme for Tackling Foreign 
Corruption" (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 245. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Joanna Harrington*  Providing for Victim Redress within
 the Legislative Scheme for Tackling
 Foreign Corruption
This article examines the prospects for victim redress for the corporate commission 
of foreign corruption, using Canada as a case study. Such cases are typically 
addressed by negotiated settlements, with Canada’s new “remediation agreement” 
regime embracing an intention to provide “reparations for harm done to victims or 
to the community.” Further work, however, needs to be done on de ning who is a 
victim, with the SNC-Lavalin affair having focussed much attention on employees, 
pensioners and shareholders, with barely a mention of the overseas victims of the 
alleged crimes. To this end, the article examines comparable efforts undertaken 
in England to ensure the interests of the overseas victims of economic crime are 
taken into account. The creation of a fund to which the  nancial penalties for foreign 
corruption could be directed to support the provision of development assistance to 
affected foreign countries is also considered.
Dans le présent article, nous examinons les perspectives de réparation pour 
les victimes de corruption commise par les entreprises à l’étranger, en utilisant 
le Canada comme étude de cas. De tels cas sont généralement réglés par 
des accords négociés, le nouveau régime canadien d’« accord de réparation » 
prévoyant de fournir « des réparations pour les dommages causés aux victimes 
ou à la communauté ». D’autres travaux sont cependant nécessaires pour dé nir 
qui est une victime, l’affaire SNC-Lavalin ayant beaucoup attiré l’attention sur 
les employés, les retraités et les actionnaires, avec à peine une mention des 
victimes étrangères des crimes présumés. À cette  n, l’article examine les efforts 
comparables entrepris en Angleterre pour garantir la prise en compte des intérêts 
des victimes étrangères de la criminalité économique. La création d’un fonds 
dans lequel les sanctions  nancières pour corruption étrangère pourraient être 
versées dans le but de soutenir la fourniture d’une aide au développement aux 
pays étrangers touchés est également envisagée.
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In early 2019, an alleged case of corporate fraud and foreign corruption 
underpinned a widely-reported political scandal in Canada that led to the 
resignations of a former minister of justice and attorney general of Canada 
(then serving as veterans minister), the president of the treasury board, the 
prime minister’s principal secretary, and Canada’s top civil servant, the 
clerk of the privy council and secretary to the Cabinet.1 That same criminal 
case also featured prominently in an inquiry conducted by the federal 
con ict of interest and ethics commissioner, who found that the prime 
minister had used his position of authority to seek to in uence the attorney 
general to further the interests of the corporation involve d.2 The scandal 
1. For the media article that  rst broke the story of the scandal, see Robert Fife, Steven Chase & 
Sean Fine, “PMO Pressed Wilson-Raybould to Abandon Prosecution of SNC-Lavalin; Trudeau Denies 
His Of ce ‘Directed’ Her,” The Globe and Mail (7 February 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com> [perma.cc/N7Q6-ABQU]. Among subsequent coverage, see Globe Staff and the Canadian Press, 
“Timeline: A Chronicle of SNC-Lavalin, Trudeau, the PMO and Jody Wilson-Raybould,” The Globe 
and Mail (12 February 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/3DPC-8V9J]. On the 
resignations, see The Canadian Press, “Jody Wilson-Raybould Resigns from Cabinet,” Maclean’s 
(12 February 2019), online: <www.macleans.ca> [perma.cc/A9KZ-RH98]; John Paul Tasker, “Gerald 
Butts Resigns as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Principal Secretary,” CBC News (18 February 
2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/QRL8-48Z4]; Kathleen Harris, “Jane Philpott Resigns from 
Cabinet, Citing Loss of ‘Con dence’ over Government’s Handling of SNC-Lavalin,” CBC News 
(4 March 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/J6FD-FQW9]; Campbell Clark, “Wernick’s Sudden 
Resignation is a Reminder of SNC Affair, Not a Quick Fix,” The Globe and Mail (19 March 2019) A8.
2. Canada, Of ce of the Con ict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Trudeau II Report, by Mario 
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continued to resonate during the national election of October 2019, with 
the former attorney general who had complained of political interference 
by the prime minister winning re-election to serve as the sole independent 
member of parliament .3
At the heart of the scandal was the Quebec-based multinational 
engineering and construction giant, the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., with a 
global workforce of thousands. Widely admired as a crown jewel of the 
Quebec corporate world, SNC-Lavalin faced criminal charges throughout 
most of 2019 arising from activities undertaken in Libya from 2001 until 
its civil war in 2011.4 Speci cally, on 19 February 2015, the company and 
two of its af liates were charged with one count of foreign bribery and 
one count of fraud arising from the alleged payment of CAD $47.7 million 
in bribes to one or more public of cials in Libya and the defrauding of 
several Libyan organizations of almost CAD $130-million .5 It later became 
known that the alleged bribes were paid to Saadi Gadda , the third son of 
the notorious Libyan ruler Muammar Gadda , using funds arising from 
the construction contracts he helped to secure for SNC-Lavalin in Libya.6
The SNC-Lavalin Group, however, professed its innocence, taking the 
position that the charges concerned the “reprehensible deeds by former 
employees who left the company long ago. ”7 Indeed, three years earlier, 
in February 2012, several SNC-Lavalin executives had left their positions 
amidst controversy,8 with one of these individuals later pleading guilty 
to Swiss charges of bribery, money laundering and corruption arising 
Dion (Ottawa: OCIEC, 2019) [Trudeau II Report].
3. Nancy MacDonald & Andrea Woo, “Federal Election 2019: Jody Wilson-Raybould Wins Seat 
in Vancouver Granville, Will Serve as Lone Independent in Parliament,” The Globe and Mail (22 
October 2019), online: <www.https://theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/NR9D-Z68D].
4. There were also allegations that SNC-Lavalin had been engaged in corrupt activities elsewhere, 
including in Canada with regards to the securing of a construction contract for a large hospital complex 
in Montreal. See, e.g., “Former SNC-Lavalin CEO Pleads Guilty in Superhospital Fraud Case,” CBC 
News (1 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/P5RP-396Y].
5. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, News Release, “RCMP Charges SNC-Lavalin” (19 February 
2015) (no longer available online; on  le with the author).
6. SNC-Lavalin would later unsuccessfully challenge the prosecution’s position that Saadi Gadda
was a foreign public of cial at a preliminary inquiry: R c SNC-Lavalin International Inc, 2019 QCCQ 
7778.
7. SNC-Lavalin, Press Release, “SNC-Lavalin Contests the Federal Charges by the Public 
Prosecution Service of Canada and Will Enter a Non-Guilty Plea,” (19 February 2015), online: SNC-
Lavalin <www.snclavalin.com> [perma.cc/68XQ-T9CB]. SNC–Lavalin’s position was also re ected 
in media reports. See, e.g., Graeme Hamilton, “SNC-Lavalin Charged with Fraud, Bribery: Charges 
Stem from Libya Deals,” National Post (20 February 2015) FP1.
8. See, e.g., The Canadian Press, “SNC-Lavalin Gadda  Controversy: Riadh Ben Aïssa, Stéphane 
Roy Dismissed Amid Mexico Smuggling Allegations,” Huf ngton Post (10 February 2012), online: 
<www.huf ngtonpost.ca> [perma.cc/9FKY-69RE].
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from activities in Libya .9 (A Swiss connection arose from the location of 
where the transfers of funds were made to execute the Libyan scheme.) 
The Swiss plea bargain also resulted in some of the monies being returned 
to SNC-Lavalin in recognition of its status as an injured party and victim 
of the individual’s crimes.10 Some, however, have proffered a competing 
narrative, suggesting that the executives  red in 2012 served as cover 
or “scapegoats” for a company so then mired in corruption that it had 
encouraged its employees to do everything necessary to obtain a lucrative 
contract.11
Notwithstanding its protestations of innocence, it was also no secret 
that SNC-Lavalin had long been keen to secure some form of negotiated 
solution, with the charges having come about after settlement talks had 
failed.12 The company made known it was open to discussing alternative 
forms of resolution, noting in its press release of 25 February 2015 “that 
companies in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom, bene t from a different approach that has been effectively 
used in the public interest to resolve similar matters.”13 At that time, 
Canadian law did not permit this “different approach,” but with a change 
in government in October 2015, an opportunity arose for SNC-Lavalin 
to lobby a new administration in Ottawa for changes to be made to the 
sentencing options provided by Canada’s Criminal Code.14 The saving 
9. Dave Seglins, “Riadh Ben Aïssa, ex-SNC-Lavalin Executive, Agrees to Settlement Plan,” 
CBC News (18 August 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/HM2Q-4794]; Nicolas Van Praet & 
Graeme Hamilton, “Ex-SNC Executive Guilty: Libyan Fixer Faces Justice,” National Post (2 October 
2014) A1-A2. Upon his release from a Swiss jail, Aïssa was extradited to Canada on corruption and 
fraud charges concerning the construction of a Montreal hospital complex and later pleaded guilty 
to a lesser charge: Jesse Feith, “Ex-SNC-Lavalin Vice-President Pleads Guilty to Charge in MUHC 
Superhospital Scandal,” Montreal Gazette (11 July 2018) A6. See also Ben Aïssa c Groupe SNC-
Lavalin Inc, 2019 QCCA 964. Later, Ben Aïssa’s predecessor in charge of SNC-Lavalin’s international 
construction division, Sami Bebawi, was found guilty of corruption offences relating to Libya: 
Jonathan Montpetit, “Former SNC-Lavalin Executive Found Guilty on Libya Corruption Charges,” 
CBC News (15 December 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/SW4Q-V9K2]. The charges 
against the division’s former comptroller, Stéphane Roy, were stayed on grounds of unreasonable 
delay: Giuseppe Valiante, “Case Thrown Out against Former SNC-Lavalin Exec,” CBC News (19 
February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/2XG7-HJ8K]. See also Roy c SNC-Lavalin Inc, 
2016 QCCS 836.
10. Van Praet & Hamilton, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Sophie Cousineau & Greg McArthur, “Fired Executive Sues SNC-Lavalin, Says 
He Always Acted on ‘Orders,’” The Globe and Mail (13 February 2013), online <www.https://
theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/PFT6-2HRS].
12. See, e.g., Les Perreaux, Jeff Gray & Bertrand Marotte, “SNC-Lavalin charged with Fraud, 
Bribery after Settlement Talks Fail,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto) (20 February 2015) A1.
13. SNC-Lavalin Press Release of 19 February 2015, supra note 7.
14. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at paras 24-27. See also David Cochrane, “Inside SNC-Lavalin’s 
Long Lobbying Campaign to Change the Sentencing Rules,” CBC News (14 February 2019), online: 
<www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/Z58U-PRZB]; Nick Taylor-Vaisey, “Where SNC-Lavalin’s Push for 
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of jobs was pitched as the key public interest at stake, with the criminal 
prosecution of a corporate giant such as SNC-Lavalin being portrayed as 
having serious negative collateral consequences for employees, pensioners 
and shareholders, given that a conviction for foreign bribery would debar 
the company from bidding on future work both in Canada and elsewhere .15
By September 2018, Canadian law had indeed been amended so as to 
permit what are known elsewhere as “deferred prosecution agreements” 
(DPAs), but under Canadian law are to be called remediation agreemen ts, 
or accords de réparation in Frenc h.16 Court records indicate that SNC-
Lavalin made overtures to the director of public prosecutions for such an 
agreement, both before the new law had entered into force and after ,17 and 
to this end, the company provided an extensive amount of information on 
its efforts since 2012 to undertake signi cant internal change, including the 
implementation of an internal ethics and compliance program, with anti-
corruption training for all employees.18 The director, however, declined 
to issue SNC-Lavalin the required invitation to negotiate a remediation 
agreemen t on the grounds that it was “not appropriate in this case,”19 leading 
to pressure from the prime minister on the attorney general to intervene. 
The prime minister was later found by Canada’s ethics commissioner in 
August 2019 to have acted contrary to the constitutional principles of 
prosecutorial independence and the rule of law.20
Four months later, a deal was reached. On 18 December 2019, the 
Court of Quebec accepted a plea of guilty to a single charge of fraud from 
Deferred Prosecution Came Up Short,” Maclean’s (22 February 2019), online: <www.macleans.ca> 
[perma.cc/LK96-GHQD].
15. Within Quebec, the Integrity in Public Contracts Act, SQ 2012, c 25, subjects commercial 
enterprises to a screening and authorization process to determine eligibility for contracts with public 
bodies. Federally, the Government of Canada uses a policy, rather than statutory, approach to provide 
for a ten-year debarment period upon conviction for foreign bribery:  Government of Canada, Public 
Services and Procurement Canada, Ineligibility and Suspension Policy, last modi ed 14 July 2017, 
online: <https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/politique-policy-eng.html> [perma.cc/B2GA-7MMU]. 
In addition, as con rmed before a recent inquiry into the effectiveness of the UK’s anti-bribery law, 
“many countries have laws which debar a convicted company from public procurement contracts, 
and still more countries have laws allowing discretionary debarment”: UK, House of Lords, Select 
Committee on the Bribery Act 2010, The Bribery Act 2010: Post-legislative Scrutiny (HL Paper 303) 
(March 2019), at para 248, online: <www.publications.parliament.uk> [perma.cc/562Z-L6SE].
16. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, Part XXII.1 (“Remediation Agreements”) [Criminal 
Code]. Enacted as Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No 1, SC 2018, c 12, s 404, the amendments were 
included within Bill C-74, An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament 
on February 27, 2018 and Other Measures (assented to on 21 June 2018, the new provisions entered 
into force on 19 September 2018) [Bill C-74].
17. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc v Canada (Public Prosecution Service), 2019 FC 282 at para 12 [SNC-
Lavalin v Canada 2019].
18. Ibid at para 13.
19. Ibid at paras 21, 24.
20. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 351.
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the subsidiary SNC–Lavalin Construction Inc., with a  ne in the amount 
of CAD $280-million to be paid in equal instalments over the next  ve 
years. In return, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada withdrew all 
charges against the parent company, the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., as 
well as its international marketing arm, SNC-Lavalin International Inc., 
with SNC-Lavalin agreeing to a term of probation and the engagement of 
an independent monitor for its compliance with international standards. 
In essence, SNC-Lavalin had secured what it had wanted all along.21 A 
subsidiary that had not been active since 2015 was found to have defrauded 
the government of Libya, and thus its people, of millions, but the parent 
company, as it stated in its press release concerning the plea deal, did 
“not anticipate that the guilty plea by a construction subsidiary…will 
affect the eligibility of SNC-Lavalin Group companies to bid on future 
projects….”22 The withdrawal of the corruption of a foreign public of cial 
charge had removed the risk of debarment from future government 
contracts.
Introduction
Clearly, the SNC-Lavalin affair raises many issues of both law and politics. 
These include the openness of a prime minister and the minister of  nance 
to the lobbying efforts of a corporation then facing criminal charges and 
the reality of some collateral economic impact to  ow with any criminal 
prosecution of a large corporation, alongside important questions of 
corporate ethics and international business standards. Questions were 
also asked about whether to split the roles of the attorney general and 
the minister of justice to further protect prosecutorial independence,23 and 
the appropriateness of former Supreme Court of Canada justices acting 
as counsel in contentious cases.24 But lost amidst all these discussions 
have been the corruption’s overseas victims, with the word “Libya” not 
mentioned even once in the ethics commissioner’s report. This article 
21. A point not missed by media commentators: Peter Zimonjic, “After Year of Political Turmoil, 
SNC-Lavalin Gets Most of What It Wanted in Plea Deal,” CBC News (18 December 2019), online: 
<www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/DCM9-AJPF].
22. SNC-Lavalin, Press Release, “SNC–Lavalin Group Settles Federal Charges” (18 December 
2019), online: SNC-Lavalin <https://www.snclavalin.com/en/media/press-releases/2019/18-12-2019> 
[perma.cc/3YJM-WU74]. See also Kamila Hinkson, “SNC-Lavalin pleads guilty to fraud for past 
work in Libya, will pay $280M  ne,” CBC News (18 December 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.
cc/L984-DWQ2].
23. See further A Anne McLellan, Review of the Roles of the Minister of Justice and the Attorney 
General of Canada (Ottawa: Of ce of the Prime Minister of Canada, 28 June 2019), online: <www.
pm.gc.ca> [perma.cc/GGP8-J3LB] (made public after the release of the Trudeau II Report, supra note 
2, on 14 August 2019).
24. See further Shannon Proudfoot, “Talk to my Former Supreme Court Judge,” Maclean’s (3 April 
2019), online: <www.macleans.ca> [perma.cc/RB5S-FA3B].
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addresses this failing by using the SNC-Lavalin affair as a springboard for 
discussing the means for securing a fuller measure of accountability for the 
corporate commission of serious economic crimes, while also highlighting 
a need for greater clarity in the law as to who is to be considered a victim. 
While recognizing the taint now associated with negotiated deals as a 
result of SNC-Lavalin’s lobbying in its own self-interest, I nevertheless 
argue that the  exibility afforded by negotiated settlements with corporate 
defendants provides the best prospects for securing some form of  nancial 
consideration for the victims of complex economic crime.
Victimhood has received much coverage throughout the SNC-Lavalin 
affair. The term victim was used to describe the employees, pensioners, 
shareholders and suppliers of SNC-Lavalin, although it is not so clear 
that they were directly victimized by the fraud and bribery. Many also 
made use of the phrase “innocent third parties” as a way of recognizing 
the collateral impact of a corporate prosecution,25 with none other than the 
deputy minister of justice and deputy attorney general of Canada using a 
combination of the terms by referring to the pensioners of SNC-Lavalin as 
“innocent victims.”26 It can be argued, however, that pensioners are victims 
because of the failings of successive governments to require corporations 
to set aside funds to meet their pension commitments and to ensure a 
super-priority to pensioners in the event of a corporate bankruptcy, rather 
than being the victims of the fraud or bribery, or the victims of a criminal 
prosecution to enforce the law concerning fraud or bribery. On the other 
hand, many pension funds are shareholders, with the deputy minister of 
justice having oddly referred to “small shareholders,” alongside employees 
and pensioners, as “innocent victims and third parties.”27 There were, 
however, other victims of the fraud and bribery that went unmentioned, 
including the competitor companies and their employees, whether in 
Canada or abroad, who lost out on work because of another’s use of 
bribery, and the organizations in Libya that were defrauded of millions.
Society as a whole is also a victim. Indeed, the use of a criminal law 
approach, as distinct from a corporate ethics approach, to address the 
problem of corruption in international business transactions embraces an 
underlying assumption that corruption is neither victimless nor harmless. 
The harm arises when corruption siphons funds from government accounts 
that could have been used for the provision of public services, with Canadian 
25. See, e.g., House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 
42-1, No 132 (21 February 2019) at 1125 (Hon David Lametti).
26. As recorded in Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 114.
27. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, No 132 
(21 February 2019) at 1125 (Nathalie Drouin).
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courts having taken the view that “a fraud against a government agency is 
not a victimless crime in that it results in a reduction in resources available 
to people who rely on government services. ”28 Our courts have also said 
that “[a]ll Canadians, and our society as a whole, are victims when public 
of cials breach the trust placed in them.”29 Similar sentiments have also 
been expressed with respect to foreign corruption by the Supreme Court 
of Canada. In a 2016 case, coincidentally arising from allegations that 
SNC-Lavalin had engaged in bribery to secure a contract in Bangladesh, 
the court wrote: “Corruption is a signi cant obstacle to international 
development. It undermines con dence in public institutions, diverts 
funds from those who are in great need of  nancial support, and violates 
business integrity. ”30 Yet questions remain as to how to provide for some 
form of victim redress in the foreign corruption context, even though the 
prospect for “reparations for harm done to victims or to the community” 
has long been recognized as a Canadian sentencing principle.31
To this end, this article is organized into four parts. In Part I, I provide 
an overview of the Canadian legislative scheme for addressing foreign 
corruption, making note of both its international impetus in 1998 and its 
substantive amendment in 2013. I also discuss the 2018 addition of the 
provisions on remediation agreements, and I discuss the de nition of a 
victim in Canadian criminal law. In Part II, I recognize the inevitably of 
a  nancial penalty causing some economic impact in corporate cases of 
foreign corruption, but I question the idea of shareholders as victims. I 
use the Canadian case of Grif ths Energy International as an illustrative 
example, with the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Of ce later seizing 
and redirecting the bene ts from bribery that went to a shareholder so as to 
provide assistance to the crime’s overseas victims. In Part III, I review the 
potential in uence of comparable developments elsewhere, and in Part IV, 
I mention the use of creative sentencing arrangements in environmental 
law in a way that provides funding for projects of assistance to victims in 
the broadest sense of the word, using Canada’s Environmental Damages 
Fund as a model. I conclude that the best prospects for victim redress for 
corporate criminality in foreign corruption cases lie with the diversion of 
some portion of the  nancial penalty incurred so as to support the funding 
of development assistance projects.
28. R v Karigar, 2014 ONSC 3093 at para 24 (citing R v Bogart, [2002] 61 OR (3d) 75 at para 33, 
leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2002] SCCA 398).
29. R v Karigar, supra note 28 at para 34 (citing R v Serré, 2013 ONSC 1732 at para 29).
30. World Bank Group v Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 at para 1.
31. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 718(e), repeated speci cally for remediation agreements in s 
715.31(e).
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I. The Canadian legislative scheme to address foreign corruption
1. The Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials Act
Motivated by the desire to establish a global set of rules applicable to all, 
there are now several international treaties requiring parties to have in 
place domestic anti-bribery and corruption laws. These treaties, and the 
domestic laws they have encouraged, make use of a criminal law approach 
to address what may once have been seen as a problem of business ethics, 
with bribery having become the standard offence for addressing acts of 
foreign corruption committed to obtain an undue advantage in international 
business.32 For Canada, the lead treaty is the 1997 Convention on 
Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Of cials in International Business 
Transaction s,33 developed by states under the auspices of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but inspired by the 
1977 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).34 Canada is also bound 
by the 1996 Inter-American Convention Against Corruptio n35 and the 
2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruptio n.36 Canada’s treaty 
obligations are then transformed into domestic law through domestic 
legislation, most notably the 1998 Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials 
Ac t (or CFPOA),37 but also the Criminal Cod e.38
As discussed in detail elsewhere ,39 the enactment in Canada of the 
CFPOA took an unusual path, with its speedy passage meaning that 
there is little on record to address current questions of concern, such 
as the de nition of victim. Although there was clearly no emergency, 
the proposed legislation came forth as a fast-tracked initiative with all-
party support, and sailed through the required phases of consideration in 
both houses of parliament within a week. The explanation for the law’s 
speedy passage rests with its international impetus and a domestic desire 
to matter. At a summit meeting in May 1998, states within the Group of 
32. See, e.g., T Markus Funk & Andrew S Boutros, eds, From Baksheesh to Bribery: Understanding 
the Global Fight Against Corruption and Graft (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
33. 17 December 1997, OECD Doc DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 ILM 1 (1998) (entered into force 15 
February 1999) [OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
34. Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1496 (1977), codi ed and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq.
35. 29 March 1996, OASTS No B-58 (entered into force 6 March 1997, rati cation by Canada on 1 
June 2000).
36. 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (entered into force 14 December 2005, rati cation by Canada 
on 2 October 2007).
37. Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials Act, SC 1998, c 34 [CFPOA].
38. See, e.g., An Act to Amend the Criminal Code in order to implement the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, SC 2007, c 13.
39. See generally Joanna Harrington, “Addressing the Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials: 
Developments and Challenges within the Canadian Legal Landscape” (2018) 56 Can YB Intl L 98.
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8 (G8)40 made a public commitment to ratify the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention before the end of 1998.41 As time passed, Canada recognized 
that its rati cation would be the one that would bring the convention into 
force, with the then minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, describing 
Canadian rati cation as “the key which will unlock the door.”42 This led 
to a rushed approach. Parliament  nalized its enactment of the CFPOA 
on 10 December 1998, enabling the executive branch to ratify the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention on 17 December 1998, and the CFPOA was later 
brought into force by cabinet on 14 February 1999,43 a day before the 
convention entered into force internationally.
As the implementation vehicle for Canada’s international obligations, 
the CFPOA makes the bribery of a foreign public of cial to obtain or 
retain an advantage in the course of business an indictable offence under 
Canadian law. Offering a bribe, however, is not the only offence of 
relevance, with the possession of property, or the proceeds of property, 
obtained through foreign bribery, and the laundering of such property or 
proceeds, also constituting offences under Canadian law .44 Canadian law 
also enables the prosecution of a conspiracy or an attempt to commit these 
offences, and also applies to situations of aiding and abetting.
In keeping with the imperatives of article 2 of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, both individuals and corporations, without regard 
to nationality, may be charged in Canada with foreign corruption. The 
word “person” is used in the CFPOA so as to include corporations, using 
the same principles of corporate criminal liability as apply to Criminal 
Code offences.45 Enforcement of the law for corporations is by  ne, with 
the department of justice having explained in 1999 that: “Corporations, 
40. First formed in 1975 to discuss matters of mutual concern, the G8 is now, once again, the Group 
of Seven (G7), with Russia having been ejected following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Canada 
joined the G7 in 1976.
41. G8 Birmingham Summit, Final Communiqué (17 May 1998) at para 7, online: G7 Information 
Centre <https://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1998birmingham/ nalcom.htm> [perma.cc/ZX85-
XBWJ].
42. Debates of the Senate, 36-1, vol 137, No 100 (3 December 1998) at 1530 (Hon Lloyd Axworthy). 
The convention’s entry into force was dependent on securing rati cation from at least  ve of the top 
ten trading countries in the OECD.
43. Order Fixing February 14, 1999 as the Date of the Coming into Force of the Act, SI/99-13.
44. CFPOA, supra note 37, ss 4-7. These CFPOA provisions were later repealed, along with similar 
provisions in other federal statutes, so as to require the use of the Criminal Code’s provisions on 
possession and laundering, rather than having individualized provisions in various federal statutes: An 
Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Law Enforcement) and to Make Consequential 
Amendments to Other Acts, SC 2001, c 32, s 58.
45. Section 2 of the CFPOA, supra note 37, de nes “person” to mean a person as de ned in section 
2 of the Criminal Code, supra note 16, which makes clear that references to “person” include an 
organization and that “organization means (a) a…body corporate.”
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of course, cannot be subject to imprisonment, but they can be  ned. The 
amount of any  ne would be at the discretion of the judge, and there is no 
maximum.”46
During the Act’s passage, Canadian parliamentarians focussed their 
discussions on the often stated goal of securing a level playing  eld for 
Canadian businesses operating abroad. Only passing reference was made 
to corruption’s corrosive effects on democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law, and there was no discussion of the place for victims within the 
new legislative scheme. It was assumed that there would be victims if the 
prohibited conduct took place, but no-one asked about how to identify 
or de ne these victims, nor was there any discussion on how to ensure 
that any recovered property or proceeds of crime would be used to assist 
the victims, assuming that an adequate means of identi cation could be 
worked out. Victim redress was simply not discussed.
When the Act underwent amendment in 2013 ,47 the then minister of 
foreign affairs, John Baird, expressly recognized that: “Every dollar that 
goes to a bribe is a dollar that does not bene t the people who desperately 
need a new school, or a new hospital, or what have you.”48 But there was 
little else said about how to remedy this situation by way of a successful 
prosecution. Instead, the 2013 amendments aimed to “answer the call for 
enhanced vigilance”49 by making certain improvements to the existing 
scheme, rather than instigating any radical change. The maximum sentence 
for individual offenders was increased from  ve to fourteen years, a new 
“books-and-records” offence speci c to foreign bribery was created, and 
the reach of the Act was extended to assert Canadian jurisdiction on the 
basis of both nationality and territory.50 The Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) was granted the exclusive authority to lay charges, thereby 
eliminating any potential for overlap with provincial police forces. The 
2013 changes also removed the defence to a foreign bribery charge for 
what are known as “grease payments” or small “facilitation payments,”51
46. The Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials Act: A Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1999) 
at 7.
47. Fighting Foreign Corruption Act, SC 2013, c 26 [FFCA].
48. “Bill S-14, An Act to amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials Act,” Senate, Standing 
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence, 41-1, No 22 (28 February 
2013) at 22:27 (Hon John Baird).
49. “Bill S-14, An Act to amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials Act,” House of Commons 
Debates, 41-1, vol 146, No 255 (24 May 2013) at 1000 (Bob Dechert).
50. FFCA, supra note 47, ss 3, 4. See further Harrington, supra note 39 at 112-120.
51. FFCA, supra note 47, s 5.
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although this particular amendment did not come into force until 31 
October 2017.52
2. Canada’s record of enforcement under the CFPOA
Yet, despite the stated desire for “enhanced vigilance,” it remains the 
case that in twenty years, there were only six convictions under Canada’s 
CFPOA. This record is a point of sensitivity for Canada’s diplomatic 
relations with other states keen to secure the global deterrence of bribery 
and corruption. Three of the six convictions concern corporations, secured 
by way of a negotiated guilty ple a ,53 while the three individuals convicted 
under the Act went to trial.54 This tally now increases to seven with the 
recent conviction and sentencing of former SNC-Lavalin executive vice-
president Sami Bebawi for corruption activities involving Libya.55
Crimes of corruption, by their covert nature, are hard to prove and 
little is said publicly by either the RCMP or the Canadian government as to 
why there have been only seven convictions in twenty plus years. It may be 
that other charges have been preferred, after a balancing of various factors, 
as illustrated by the guilty plea to a single charge of fraud for an SNC-
Lavalin construction subsidiary in December 2019.56 There may also be 
active investigations underway, with the government taking the view that 
“allegations of corruption…are…treated with the utmost con dence for 
reasons of privacy and ensuring the integrity of investigations.”57 A simple 
52. Order Fixing October 31, 2017 as the Day on which Subsection 3(2) of the Act Comes into 
Force, SI/2017-69, (2017) C Gaz II, 3233. See also Global Affairs Canada, News Release, “Canada 
repeals facilitation payments exception in Corruption of Foreign Public Of cials Act” (30 October 
2017), online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/10/
canada_repeals_facilitationpaymentsexceptionincorruptionofforeig.html> [perma.cc/29WF-MN55].
53. The leading case is R v Grif ths Energy International Inc, [2013] AJ No 412 (QB), while the 
other case of note is R v Niko Resources Ltd, [2011] AJ No 1586, 101 WCB (2d) 118 (Alta QB). 
The third case involved charges against both an individual and a corporation but was resolved by a 
negotiated guilty plea for the corporation: R v Watts and Hydro-Kleen Systems Inc, [2005] AJ No 568 
(QB).
54. The leading case is R v Karigar, 2013 ONSC 5199, appeal from conviction dismissed 2017 
ONCA 576, leave to appeal refused, [2017] SCCA 385 (concerning an attempt to bribe of cials in 
India to secure a software contract with Air India). Two other individuals involved were also convicted: 
R v Barra and Govindia, 2019 ONSC 1786.
55. Jesse Feith, “SNC-Lavalin: Sami Bebawi Sentenced to 8½ Years for Fraud, Corruption,” 
Montreal Gazette (11 January 2020), online: <www.https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/
snc-lavalin-sami-bebawi-sentenced-to-8-5-years-in-prison-for-fraud-corruption/> [perma.cc/85LA-
X3PP].
56. SNC-Lavalin Press Release of 18 December 2019, supra note 22.
57. An archive of annual reports to parliament can be found at: Global Affairs Canada, Bribery and 
Corruption, online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/other-autre/corruption.aspx?lang=eng> [perma.cc/X2LL-SD7J]. The number of active or 
ongoing investigations used to be reported annually and publicly, as noted in Harrington, supra note 
39 at 102.
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conviction tally also overlooks the fact that some Canadian investigations 
may serve to support taking prosecutorial action elsewhere, with it possible 
that the RCMP’s search of SNC-Lavalin’s Montreal headquarters in April 
201258 provided some assistance in the Swiss proceedings against an SNC-
Lavalin former executive that secured a guilty plea in 2014.59
Similarly, little is said about Canada’s record of acquittals and stayed 
proceedings under the Act, with this tally being twice that recorded by the 
OECD given the latter’s focus on acquittals.60 A fuller report of Canada’s 
record of unsuccessful cases would have to include the charges against all 
 ve individuals alleged to have taken part in the foreign bribery scheme 
concerning the Padma bridge construction project in Bangladesh,61 as 
well as a sixth individual who was charged in 2016 for offering a bribe to 
Thai of cials,62 but for whom the charges were withdrawn in 2017.63 Of 
the  ve individuals charged in relation to the Bangladesh bridge project 
—with this being the same project that led to SNC-Lavalin’s negotiated 
ten-year debarment from bidding on World Bank projects64—two had 
their charges withdrawn as the jurisdictional connection to Canada was 
unsound, while the remaining three were acquitted for lack of evidence 
after the trial judge excluded the wiretap evidence obtained by the RCMP 
on the basis of an authorization that it had secured using information that 
it had failed to verify.65
58. Paul Waldie, Ingrid Peritz & Graeme Smith, “RCMP Makes Second Search of SNC-Lavalin,” 
The Globe and Mail (13 April 2012), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/rcmp-
makes-second-search-of-snc-lavalin/article4100225/> [perma.cc/ME6H-DWTX]; “SNC-Lavalin’s 
Montreal of ces Raided by RCMP,” CBC News (13 April 2012), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/snc-lavalin-s-montreal-of ces-raided-by-rcmp-1.1170982> [perma.cc/7NAQ-
PZS7].
59. Van Praet & Hamilton, supra note 9.
60. OECD Working Group on Bribery, 2018 Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention: 
Investigations, Proceedings, and Sanctions (December 2019) at 2, online (pdf): <https://www.oecd.
org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Anti-Bribery-Convention-Enforcement-Data-2019.pdf> [perma.
cc/C6HR-7459].
61. Chowdhury v The Queen, 2014 ONSC 2635; R v Wallace, 2017 ONSC 0132.
62. “Canadian General Aircraft President Charged with Conspiring to Bribe Thai Of cials in Plane 
Deal,” CBC News (24 November 2016), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/rcmp-
bribery-larry-kushniruk-canadian-general-aircraft-thai-airways-1.3866073> [perma.cc/292X-K49Q].
63. Meghan Grant, “Charges Dropped against Calgary Man Accused of Conspiring to Bribe 
Thai Of cials in Jet Deal,” CBC News (6 December 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/calgary/rcmp-bribery-larry-kushniruk-canadian-general-aircraft-thai-airways-charge-
stayed-1.4436289> [perma.cc/5TGZ-UXT7].
64. The World Bank, Press Release, “World Bank Debars SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its Af liates for 
10 years” (17 April 2013), online: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/
world-bank-debars-snc-lavalin-inc-and-its-af liates-for-ten-years> [perma.cc/7TSL-ZQ42].
65. R v Wallace, 2017 ONSC 0132; See also Jacques Gallant, “Judge Acquits SNC-Lavalin Execs, 
Say RCMP Relied on ‘Gossip,’” Toronto Star (10 February 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/
news/gta/2017/02/10/judge-acquits-snc-lavalin-execs-says-rcmp-relied-on-gossip.html> [perma.cc/
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3. The remediation agreement provisions in the Criminal Code
As for the sentencing options available for the corporate commission of 
foreign corruption, Canada opted in 2018 to expand what was available 
by adopting what some have pitched as a made-in-Canada version of a 
deferred prosecution agreement regime. This regime was bolted on to both 
the CFPOA and the Criminal Code, again through the speedy passage of 
legislation by parliament. The new law enables prosecutors to negotiate 
deferred prosecution agreements for certain speci ed criminal offences of 
an economic character, including the bribing of a foreign public of cial and 
the maintenance or destruction of books and records to facilitate or hide 
such a bribe.66 The new scheme aims to hold an organization accountable, 
oblige the imposition of corrective measures, and encourage the voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing.67
In considering this change to the law, Canada engaged in a public 
consultation process in the fall of 2017, resulting in feedback from 
businesses, industry associations, justice sector stakeholders, non-
governmental organizations and academics .68 According to the 
government’s summary of the results, published in February 2018, a 
majority supported the change, viewing a deferred prosecution agreement 
regime as “a useful additional tool for prosecutors to use at their discretion 
in appropriate circumstances to address corporate wrongdoing. ”69
Criticism later emerged that more time was needed to study the proposal.70
Nevertheless,  ve days after the release of the consultation results, as noted 
in the ethics commissioner’s report,71 the government of Canada introduced 
legislation to amend the Criminal Code to provide for what would be 
termed in Canadian law a “remediation agreement.” This terminology 
presumably was chosen to convey the idea that these are tools “focused 
WN7D-JTND].
66. Criminal Code, supra note 16, Schedule to Part XXII.1, s 2.
67. Ibid, ss 715.31(b)-(d).
68. See further Expanding Canada’s Toolkit to Address Corporate Wrongdoing: Discussion Paper 
for Public Consultation: Deferred Prosecution Agreement Stream (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 
2017) [2017 Discussion Paper]. See also Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at paras 34-35.
69. See Expanding Canada’s Toolkit to Address Corporate Wrongdoing: What We Heard (Ottawa: 
Government of Canada, 2018) at 4 [What We Heard]. See also Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 
40.
70. See Andy Blatchford, “Federal Budget Bill Quietly Proposes Tool to Ease Penalties for 
Corporate Crime,” iPolitics (15 May 2018), online: <https://ipolitics.ca/2018/05/15/federal-budget-
bill-quietly-proposes-tool-to-ease-penalties-for-corporate-crime/> [perma.cc/A8NL-NZ8P]. See also 
John Geddes, “The Government’s Case for ‘Remediation Agreements’ Made no Mention of SNC-
Lavalin,” Maclean’s (13 February 2019), online: <https://www.macleans.ca/politics/the-governments-
case-for-remediation-agreements-makes-no-mention-of-snc-lavalin/> [perma.cc/XVX8-QBYY].
71. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 41.
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on rehabilitation rather than on punishment.”72 The amendments were 
included in a 582-page omnibus budget bil l,73 sponsored by the minister of 
 nance, and as such, were not extensively debated by parliamentarians .74
Now found as Part XXII.1 of the Criminal Code, the new provisions 
entered into force on 21 September 2018.75
As with the use of deferred prosecution agreements in the United 
States and the jurisdiction of England and Wales,76 Canada’s regime for 
remediation agreements offers an alternative to prosecution for corporations 
willing to carry out certain speci ed obligations in return for a stay of 
criminal charges. There is no legal right to a remediation agreement, with 
their availability governed by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.77 An 
over-arching public interest test governs the exercise of that discretion,78
taking into account such factors as the corporation’s self-reporting of 
wrongdoing, the actions taken in response, and the culpability of senior 
management, as well as any record of previous wrongdoing.79
For foreign corruption cases, the new provisions on remediation 
agreements also make clear that “the prosecutor must not consider the 
national economic interest, the potential effect on relations with a state other 
than Canada or the identity of the organization or individual involved.”80
This prohibition is a verbatim copy of the pre-existing obligations of article 
5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Conventio n, with the bar on considering the 
“national economic interest” prompting a debate in Canada throughout 
much of 2019 as to whether this phrase can be interpreted in some way 
so as to keep a large employer viable to save jobs and pensions.81 Indeed, 
72. What We Heard, supra note 69 at 14.
73. See Bill C-74, supra note 16, which received First Reading in the House of Commons on 27 
March 2018.
74. There are only four instances of discussion of the remediation agreements provisions in the 
House of Commons and the Senate during the budget bill debates, with the most notable occurring 
at a meeting of the former’s Standing Committee on Finance at which the lead civil servant with 
responsibility for the proposed legislation provided an overview and answered questions: House of 
Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, 42-1, No 154 (8 May 2018) at 21:25 (Ann 
Sheppard, Senior Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice) [Ann Sheppard 
Committee Evidence].
75. Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No 1, supra note 16, s 409.
76. Deferred prosecution agreements are not available in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
77. As con rmed in SNC-Lavalin v Canada 2019, supra note 17. See also Ann Sheppard Committee 
Evidence, supra note 74.
78. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.32(1)(c).
79. Ibid, s 715.32(2).
80. Ibid, s 715.32(3).
81. See, in particular, Donald Johnston, “Was SNC-Lavalin Denied a Deal All Because of Three 
Simple but Misunderstood Words,” Financial Post (22 March 2019), online: <https://business.
financialpost.com/opinion/was-snc-lavalin-denied-a-deal-all-because-of-three-simple-but-
misunderstood-words> [perma.cc/8FRU-EJGK] (the author having served two terms as the OECD 
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the former clerk to the privy council and secretary to the cabinet put 
forward the view that the convention’s bar on “national economic interest” 
considerations had an inter-state meaning such that “you cannot favour or 
let a company off because it helps France versus Germany, or Germany 
versus Italy, or Canada versus the United States,” but he maintained the 
view that “[t]he [economic] impact on suppliers, pensioners, customers, 
communities is a relevant public interest consideration.”82 It was later 
reported by the ethics commissioner that the prime minister’s counsel had 
argued that “the exclusion under the Criminal Code for considerations 
of ‘national economic interest’ is not intended to apply to non-culpable 
stakeholders,” but no supporting authority was referenced.83
And yet, the view of the OECD Working Group on Bribery is clear. 
While the phrase “national economic interest” is not de ned in the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, and the drafting history provides no assistance,84
the Working Group has advised that there are no permissible degrees 
of economic interest which would justify in uencing a prosecutorial 
decision.85 Indeed, Canada was told as much in 2004 when a Canadian 
effort to distinguish “proper” from “improper” considerations of national 
economic interest led the Working Group to recommend that Canada 
“clarify that, in investigating and prosecuting the bribery of a foreign 
public of cial, there are no proper considerations of national economic 
interest….”86 This recommendation was repeated again in a 2006 study 
by the Working Group,87 wherein it was also accepted that “where large 
secretary-general from 1996 to 2006); See also Jonathan Montpetit, “Why Quebec Sees SNC-Lavalin 
as an Asset, not a Liability,” CBC News (14 February 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/snc-lavalin-quebec-prosecution-1.5018472> [perma.cc/4TAA-HHKK]; but see 
Allan Lanthier, “The Inconvenient Reality: Economic Interest has Nothing to do with SNC-Lavalin 
Getting a DPA,” The Globe and Mail (11 March 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
opinion/article-the-inconvenient-reality-economic-interest-has-nothing-to-do-with-snc/> [perma.
cc/29WH-ZLYT]; See also the opinion of Kenneth Jull, counsel with Gardiner Roberts LLP: House of 
Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, No 133 (25 February 
2019) at 17:10 (Kenneth Jull).
82. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, No 138 
(6 March 2019) at 14:10 (Michael Wernick).
83. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 241, and for the ethics commissioner’s assessment, at 
paras 308-319.
84. There is no formal drafting history or of cial travaux préparatoires for the negotiations of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Cecily Rose, International Anti-Corruption Norms: Their Creation 
and In uence on Domestic Legal Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 41-42.
85. See generally Peter J Cullen & Mark Pieth, “Enforcement” in Mark Pieth, Lucinda A Low 
& Nicola Bonucci, eds, The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary, 2nd ed (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 349-396, especially 370-380.
86. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Canada: Phase 2 (25 March 2004) at para 80, online (pdf): 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/31643002.pdf> [perma.cc/ZQ8N-
Q8Z6].
87. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports (22 May 2006) at para 
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companies are involved, enforcement actions…could potentially affect the 
national economy of the relevant Parties.”88 Canada was reminded again 
of the Working Group’s position in 2011,89 and it should have come as no 
surprise that during the SNC-Lavalin affair, Canada was put on notice that 
the Working Group was following the situation closely.90
It must also be emphasized that Canadian law clearly states that to 
enter into negotiations for a remediation agreement, a prosecutor must be 
of the opinion that there is a reasonable prospect of conviction with respect 
to the offence.91 The negotiation of a remediation agreement also requires 
the consent of the attorney general,92 and where negotiations result in an 
agreement, judicial approval is then required,93 with a judge required to 
consider if “the agreement is in the public interest” and whether its terms 
are “fair, reasonable and proportionate to the gravity of the offence.”94
Remediation agreements are, therefore, not secret, behind-the-scenes, 
out-of-court settlements, with the above requirements for independent 
scrutiny serving to protect the public interest, although some worry that 
these safeguards may deter corporate self-disclosure given the absence 
of a guarantee in return.95 However, the new regime also presumes that 
remediation agreements approved by a court will be made public,96 with 
publication enabling “other companies to see the kinds of terms that 
might be negotiated, if they were in a similar situation.”97 Publication and 
transparency are also key factors in maintaining public con dence in the 
justice system.
As to their content, section 715.34(1) of the Criminal Code requires 
a remediation agreement to include a statement of the relevant facts, an 
admission of responsibility, and an indication of the penalty to be paid and 
277, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/DN9Z-2SDP].
88. Ibid at para 284.
89. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention in Canada (18 March 2011) at paras 110-112, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.
cc/5FKQ-7VMA].
90. OECD, “OECD will follow Canadian proceedings addressing allegations of political interference 
in foreign bribery prosecution” (11 March 2019), online: <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/6KDA-6J9H].
91. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.32(1)(a).
92. Ibid at s 715.32(1)(d).
93. Ibid at s 715.37(1).
94. Ibid at s 715.37(6).
95. Provisions on the non-admissibility of certain admissions have been included to offset this 
concern, but some may still worry that details once disclosed, cannot be taken back: Criminal Code, 
supra note 16, ss 715.33(2), 715.34(2). The potential use in court of “deferred prosecution agreement 
negotiation material” was expressly recognized as a “sensitive matter” in the government’s 2017 
Discussion Paper, supra note 68 at 11.
96. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.42.
97. Ann Sheppard Committee Evidence, supra note 74 at 21:29.
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the forfeiture of any bene t that was improperly received. A remediation 
agreement also imposes ongoing reporting obligations, and it imposes 
corporate obligations of cooperation and assistance with the aim of 
supporting the investigation and prosecution of the individuals involved in 
the crimes.98 A corporation may also be required to establish a compliance 
plan to improve such matters as internal control procedures and employee 
training, and in some cases, an independent monitor will be appointed to 
report to the prosecutor on progress.99 If the corporation meets the terms 
of the remediation agreement, the prosecutor will apply to a judge for 
an order of successful completion.100 The charges will be stayed, and no 
criminal conviction will result. But if the corporation breaches a term of the 
remediation agreement, the criminal proceedings could be recommenced, 
and a prosecution could take place,101 although provision is also made for 
varying the terms of an approved remediation agreement.102
4. Providing for victims in Canadian criminal law
According to a purpose clause included within the new law, the 
remediation agreements regime aims to “denounce” wrongdoing and 
“provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community.”103 This 
wording re ects the existing content and phrasing of the key objectives 
for sentencing those convicted of crimes already found in the Criminal 
Code.104 However, while the purpose clause identi es victim reparations 
as an aim,105 it also provides that the law aims “to reduce the negative 
consequences of the wrongdoing for persons—employees, customers, 
pensioners and others—who did not engage in the wrongdoing.”106 This 
emphasis on addressing the negative consequences for various third parties 
was also highlighted by the government’s spokesperson in the Senate during 
the law’s enactment, who emphasized that “[r]emediation agreements can 
98. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.34(1)(d). Re ecting on the American experience with 
deferred prosecution agreements, the former US Attorney General Eric Holder has stated that “the 
greatest deterrent effect is not to prosecute a corporation…[i]t is to prosecute the individuals in that 
corporation that are responsible for those decisions,” as cited in Nicholas Ryder, “‘Too Scared to 
Prosecute and Too Scared to Jail?’ A Critical and Comparative Analysis of Enforcement of Financial 
Crime Legislation Against Corporations in the USA and the UK” (2018) 82:3 J Crim L 245 at 254. 
According to one expert witness, cooperation to obtain a deferred prosecution agreement in the US 
“entails providing human beings for the Government to prosecute”: UK Select Committee on the 
Bribery Act, supra note 15 at 87.
99. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.34(3).
100. Ibid at s 715.4.
101. Ibid at s 715.39.
102. Ibid at s 715.38.
103. Ibid at s 715.31(a),(e).
104. Ibid at s 718(a), (e).
105. Ibid at s 715.31(e).
106. Ibid at s 715.31(f).
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save jobs, investment and a company’s contribution to our economy.”107
A backgrounder published by the federal department of justice when the 
new law came into effect also draws attention to the “serious impact” of 
economic crime “on the economy and on innocent third parties, such as 
employees,”108 with the impact of a conviction on employees and others 
having been raised by SNC-Lavalin in its judicial review application.109
However, not all would include investors or shareholders in the same 
category as employees and pensioners, particularly if one takes the view 
that those who bene t from the risks of investing, should also shoulder 
the burdens. Well-established legal scholars of corporate criminality have 
written that “[j]ustice as fairness requires, as a minimum, that the cost 
of corporate offences be internalised by the enterprise. ”110 On the other 
hand, it must be generally recognized that many pension funds are major 
investors in publicly listed companies.
With respect to remedies, the new provisions expressly state that 
remediation agreements may “provide reparations for harm done to 
victims or the community,”111 with “victim” in the foreign corruption 
context de ned to include “any person outside Canada.”112 Indeed, victim 
compensation is often cited as a key feature of deferred prosecution 
agreement schemes, with those who comply being required to pay a form 
of “anticipated restitution” in the absence of a formal conviction.113 This 
language of restitution is required for jurisdictional reasons in Canada, 
although it also leads to dif culties. Within the Canadian federation, 
criminal law is an area of jurisdiction for the Parliament of Canada ,114
with the courts having held that this jurisdiction extends to include the 
restitution of readily ascertainable losses following a conviction as part of 
the sentencing process.115 The practical reality, however, of this situation 
107. “Bill C-74, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on 27 
February 2018 and other measures,” 2nd reading, Debates of the Senate, 42-1, No 218 (11 June 2018) 
at 1830 (Grant Mitchell).
108. Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Media Release, “Remediation Agreements and 
Orders to Address Corporate Crime: Backgrounder” (11 September 2018), online: <www.canada.ca> 
[perma.cc/9GTV-L69P] [Department of Justice, “Backgrounder”].
109. SNC-Lavalin v Canada 2019, supra note 17 at paras 13, 31, 109.
110. See Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, “The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability” (1988) 11:3 Sydney L Rev 508, cited with approval 
in CMV Clarkson, “Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls” (1996) 59:4 Modern L Rev 
557 at 563.
111. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at ss 715.31(e), 715.32(2)(e), 715.34(1)(g).
112. Ibid at s 715.3(1).
113. 2017 Discussion Paper, supra note 68 at 12.
114. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(27), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, 
No 5.
115. R v Zelensky, [1978] 2 SCR 940, 86 DLR (3d) 179; see also Criminal Code, supra note 16 at ss 
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is unsatisfactory as it seems illogical for victim compensation to be 
available in the simple case of foreign bribery, but not in highly complex 
cases involving carefully structured multijurisdictional layers of payments 
and kickbacks. As for provincial (and territorial) efforts, there are various 
forms of victims assistance schemes available, but none aim to provide 
support or assistance for foreign victims of crime.
Canada’s statutory scheme for remediation agreements also makes 
provision for victims’ rights to information and participation, with the 
prosecutor under a duty to inform victims and their representatives soon 
after an offer to negotiate a remediation agreement has been accepted by 
the corporation.116 At the judicial approval stage, the court is also required 
to consider any reparations made to victims and the content of any victim 
or community impact statements,117 and if necessary, a judicially-approved 
remediation agreement need not be published to protect the identity of 
victims, among others.118 Provision is also made for the imposition of a 
victim surcharge on top of the  nancial penalty incurred,119 although to 
whom these funds will bene t in practice remains unclear. In the past, 
sizeable victim surcharges have been paid by corporations in Canadian 
foreign corruption cases ostensibly in support of victims’ assistance 
programs,120 but without any mention of the foreign victims of the crimes. 
In the Grif ths Energy International case, involving a negotiated plea 
deal to settle a charge of paying bribes to in uence the award of resource 
development rights in Chad, the corporation involved paid a  ne of CAD 
$9 million and a victim surcharge of CAD $1.35 million.121 In the Niko 
Resources case, involving a negotiated plea deal to settle a charge of paying 
bribes to secure concessions in Bangladesh, the corporation paid a  ne 
738-741.2.
116. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.36. For con rmation of the policy intent, see House of 
Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, 42-1, No 157 (23 May 2018) at 1615 (Ann 
Sheppard).
117. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.37(3)(a), (c).
118. Ibid at s 715.42(3)(b).
119. Ibid at s 715.37(5). The amount of the victim surcharge is 30% “or any other percentage that the 
prosecutor deems appropriate in the circumstances.”
120. Assessed at 15%, then later 30%, of any  ne, the federal victim surcharge was introduced in 1989, 
and made mandatory in 2013, as a way to make offenders more accountable and to offset some of the 
costs of funding victims’ programs and services. However, in removing scope for judicial discretion to 
alleviate the surcharge’s impact on offenders with no ability to pay, the government opened the door 
to a constitutional challenge, with the victim surcharge law declared invalid in December 2018: R v 
Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58.
121. Grif ths Energy International, supra note 53 at paras 10, 28. See also Jen Gerson, “Guilty Plea 
for Calgary Firm—Energy Company—Grif ths Energy Paid Of cials in Chad $2-million,” National 
Post (Toronto edition) (23 January 2013) A4; Brian Hutchinson, “Law Firms Consulted Before $2M 
Briber—Grif ths Energy—Fined $10.3M After Admitting Illicit Payment,” National Post (Toronto 
edition) (28 January 2013) A1-A2.
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of CAD $8.26 million and a victim surcharge of CAD $1.239 million.122
In both cases, the victim surcharge was payable to the Alberta treasury 
without any mention of using these funds for victim assistance activities 
of relevance to either Chad or Bangladesh. One is guessing, but perhaps 
the reality of this situation is why the new provisions on remediation 
agreements expressly state that the victim surcharge is not available for 
offences under the CFPOA.123
There remains, however, further work to be done on de ning a victim, 
with clarity needed as to whether this categorization may also include a 
company’s employees, pensioners and/or shareholders, or indeed, whether 
the terminology of “victims” and “innocent third parties” that is found 
within the law on remediation agreements might be interchangeable. 
Within its consultation documents, the government acknowledged that 
“in the case of economic crime, the ‘victim’ may not be an identi able 
individual, but rather the employees, stakeholders of the company or 
one of its competitors, or, in the case of foreign bribery, for example, the 
citizens of another country.”124 However, the interests of the stakeholders 
were clearly accorded greater weight, with the purpose of a remediation 
agreement identi ed as being to “help to mitigate unintended consequences 
associated with a criminal conviction for blameless employees, customers, 
pensioners, suppliers and investors.”125 Indeed, it was expressly stated 
within the response to the consultation that “[w]hile victim remediation was 
considered to be a laudable goal, it was acknowledged that it is only viable 
where the victims may be identi ed and the harm quanti ed.”126 A few 
participants in the consultation also “indicated that victim compensation is 
best left to the civil courts.”127
Nevertheless, as enacted, the new law contains a purpose clause, 
wherein victims are addressed in a separate objective from that concerning 
employees, customers, pensioners and shareholders.128 In its backgrounder, 
the department of justice does not comment further, noting only that the 
new law “could help result in faster compensation to victims and protect 
122. Niko Resources, supra note 53 at para 21. See also Greg McArthur, “Canadian Firm to Admit 
to Overseas Bribery: Lengthy RCMP Probe Ends with Niko Resources’ Guilty Plea Over Attempts to 
In uence Bangladeshi minister,” The Globe and Mail (24 June 2011) A1, online: The Globe and Mail 
<www.theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/7MDR-7K34].
123. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.34(1)(h).
124. 2017 Discussion Paper, supra note 68 at 12.
125. What We Heard, supra note 69 at 6; see also ibid at 13.
126. Ibid at 14, 19.
127. Ibid at 20.
128. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at ss 715.31(e), (f).
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jobs of innocent employees and investments of innocent shareholders.”129
The word “victim” is, however, a de ned term in Canadian criminal law. 
Section 2 of the Criminal Code provides that a “victim means a person 
against whom an offence has been committed, or is alleged to have been 
committed, who has suffered, or is alleged to have suffered, physical 
or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss as the result of 
the commission or alleged commission of the offence.” The Code also 
de nes “complainant” as “the victim of an alleged offence.”130 When  rst 
introduced in 1999,131 the de nition of victim simply read that a “victim 
includes the victim of an alleged offence,” with this de nition, according 
to the then justice minister, Anne McLellan, purposely left open to let 
common sense and the judgments of the courts decide who is a victim.132
It was also introduced so as to avoid the argument that there cannot be 
a victim without, or until there is, a conviction.133 The Criminal Code 
de nition of “victim” was later expanded in 2015, with the end result 
connecting victimhood with the suffering of harm, while also expanding 
harm to include property damage and economic loss.134 This wording may 
well suggest that shareholders might be considered victims in a case of 
corporate economic crime, with the 2015 de nition clearly intended by 
parliamentarians to serve as a broad de nition, capable of covering all 
persons directly affected by an offence, even when an offence has not 
been committed against them personally.135 The current de nition also 
appears to be exhaustive, with Part XXII.1 of the Code on “Remediation 
Agreements” expressly incorporating the section 2 de nition of victim 
within its de nitional section in section 715.3(1), while also adding the 
extra proviso that the term also “includes any person outside Canada” 
when dealing with corruption of foreign public of cials offences.136
129. Department of Justice, “Backgrounder,” supra note 108. But see Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 
110.
130. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 2.
131. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Victims of Crime) and Another Act in Consequence, SC 
1999, c 25, s 1. A more expansive de nition of victim could be found in the Criminal Code, supra 
note 16 at s 722(4), but its application was tied to the provision of victim impact statements at the 
sentencing or discharge phase.
132. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 36-1, No 134 
(22 April 1999) at 1200 (Hon Anne McLellan).
133. Ibid; see also Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 36-1, No 72 (9 
June 1999) (Catherine Kane, Counsel, Criminal Law Policy, Department of Justice).
134. Canadian Victims Bill of Rights, SC 2015, c 13, s 2.
135. “Bill C-32, An Act to enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and to amend certain Acts,” 2nd 
reading, House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 72 (9 April 2014) at 1610 (Hon Peter MacKay); “Bill 
C-32, An Act to enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and to amend certain Acts,” 3rd reading, 
House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 176 (20 February 2015) at 1005 (Hon Peter MacKay).
136. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.3(1).
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II. The inevitability of economic consequences and shareholders as 
victims
Corporations cannot go to jail. The accountability option available 
upon conviction is a  nancial penalty, which inevitably must have some 
economic consequences for the corporation involved in order for the 
penalty to serve as a deterrent. In the foreign corruption context, these  nes 
can be extensive, often ranging in the millions of dollars for the corporate 
offender. Rolls-Royce Plc, for example, incurred a  nancial penalty of 
GBP £239-million for foreign bribery in 2017, with that  ne to have been 
higher, but for what was described by the English Crown Court as the 
company’s “extraordinary” cooperation with prosecuting authorities .137
An order was also made for the disgorgement of pro ts in the amount of 
GBP £258-million, and like SNC-Lavalin, Rolls-Royce employed some 
50,000 people worldwide, with its reputation in the  eld of engineering 
motivating the court to conclude that it was “properly considered a 
company of central importance to the United Kingdom.”138
These huge sums are then paid to the public accounts of the 
governments of the prosecuting authority, with no obligation to pay 
forward any of the funds to the government or people of the foreign 
country affected. In some cases, compensation might also be available, as 
might asset recovery and the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, although 
it is often not easy to trace with suf cient precision the losses that result, 
or the pro ts that were gained, from a complex scheme of foreign bribery. 
Indeed, it is the very complexity of corporate crime that favours the use 
of negotiated settlements, given the dif culties in proving matters at trial, 
with the obvious topics for negotiation being the amount of the  ne to be 
incurred and any credit or discount to be applied in recognition of corporate 
cooperation and/or voluntary self-disclosur e.139 It is also inevitable that 
consideration will be given to the consequences of a conviction, with a 
guilty plea, as distinct from a stayed prosecution, for foreign corruption 
charges raising the prospect of debarment from consideration for future 
137. Serious Fraud Of ce v Rolls Royce Plc, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 249 (Crown Court) at paras 21-
22.
138. Ibid at para 2; see also United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce, News Release, “SFO Completes 
£497.25m Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Rolls-Royce PLC” (17 January 2017), online: 
<www.sfo.gov.uk> [perma.cc/KB3K-U369].
139. In England and Wales, the Sentencing Council’s recommended maximum discount of 30% for 
a guilty plea has increased to 50% in corporate bribery cases settled through deferred prosecution 
agreements. For a full discussion, see UK Select Committee on the Bribery Act, supra note 15 at paras 
284-310.
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lucrative work. The impact of debarment has also been considered at the 
judicial approval phase for a deferred prosecution agreement .140
There remains, however, the question of whether the shareholders 
in a company should be considered victims or innocent third parties 
particularly in the foreign corruption context where the bene ts of a 
bribery arrangement may well have secured the pro table work and an 
increase in share value. The Grif ths Energy International case provides 
an illustrative example. In that case ,141 Grif ths Energy International 
(GEI) had engaged in the bribery of the wife of the ambassador of Chad to 
the United States and Canada, and the wife of the deputy chief of Chad’s 
diplomatic mission, in return for assistance in securing a contract with the 
Republic of Chad. The bribes, (a description contested by the individuals 
involved),142 consisted of the payment of a USD $2 million consultancy fee 
and the grant of four million shares in GEI at a price of $0.001 per share. 
In January 2011, GEI secured the desired production-sharing contract with 
Chad, and in February 2011, the company founded by the ambassador’s 
wife received its payment of the USD $2 million fee. Six months later, 
GEI underwent a change of management. During preparations to become 
a publicly-traded company, the bribery arrangements were discovered, 
leading to the company’s voluntary self-disclosure of wrongdoing to law 
enforcement authorities in both Canada and the United States. In January 
2013, a plea deal on foreign corruption charges was reached between GEI 
and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, resulting in the payment 
of a CAD $10.35 million  ne. That deal saved the company, which later 
changed its name to Caracal Energy, and by July 2013, had begun trading 
shares on the London Stock Exchange.143 By mid-2014, Caracal Energy, 
and its valuable prospects in Chad, had been acquired by the Anglo-Swiss 
commodities and resources giant Glencore Xstrata Plc for GBP £807 
million,144 leading to a surge in value for the company’s shareholders.145
140. Serious Fraud Of ce v Rolls Royce Plc, supra note 137 at paras 52-55.
141. R v Grif ths Energy International Inc, supra note 53. The facts are also set out in detail in Serious 
Fraud Of ce v Saleh, [2015] EWHC 2119 (QB) at paras 11-23 [Saleh (2015)]; Saleh v Director of 
the Serious Fraud Of ce, [2017] EWCA Civ 18 at paras 6-21 [Saleh (2017)]; Serious Fraud Of ce v 
Saleh, [2018] EWHC 1012 (QB) (BAILII) at paras 14-51 [Saleh (2018)].
142. See Bechir v Gowling La eur Henderson LLP, 2017 ABQB 667 at paras 15-18.
143. The factual background can be found in Harrington, supra note 39 at 127-128.
144. Ashley Armstrong, “Glencore Gatecrashes Caracal Energy Deal with Rival £807m Cash Offer,” 
The Telegraph (14 April 2014), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk> [perma.cc/7BSS-S593]; Alexis Flynn, 
“Glencore Xstrata Buys Caracal Energy,” The Wall Street Journal (14 April 2014), online: <www.wsj.
com> [perma.cc/G3R3-JCA2]. Announced in April, the acquisition took place in July 2014. Glencore 
had merged with Xstrata in 2013 and is now known simply as Glencore.
145. Neil Hume & Xan Rice, “Glencore Xstrata Buys Chad-Focussed Oil and Gas Group Caracal,” 
Financial Times (14 April 2014), online: <www.ft.com/content/68960974-c3da-11e3-a8e0-
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Acquisition by the world’s largest mining company, with revenues in the 
billions, also meant that at GBP £5.50 per share, the four million shares 
provided as an bribe to the two wives were now worth an estimated GBP 
£22 million.
Securing the forfeiture of these bene ts was not an easy task. A 
forfeiture application was initiated in Canada, but later withdrawn, with the 
chief federal prosecutor providing no reasons.146 In July 2014, the shares 
were surrendered to the stock transfer agent handling the acquisition of 
Caracel Energy by Glencore, and the proceeds of their sale were deposited 
in an account with the Royal Bank of Scotland, leading to the involvement 
of the leading British prosecutorial authority for matters of economic 
crime, the Serious Fraud Of ce (SFO). Acting on its own initiative, and 
in response to a US Department of Justice request, the SFO then took 
the necessary steps to secure a property freezing order for the proceeds 
of the sale.147 The wife of the deputy chief of mission, Ikram Mahamet 
Saleh, then went to court in England to seek the release of a sum of GBP 
£4.4 million, being the proceeds from the sale of the 800,000 shares she 
had acquired in 2009 for CAD $800.148 She was unsuccessful, leading to 
the alleged proceeds of crime from the Grif ths Energy bribery scheme 
being seized—not by the actions of the Canadian authorities, but by 
British authorities,149 with the SFO having advertised its success in what 
it calls the “Chad Oil case. ”150 As for the shares held by the ambassador’s 
wife, those became the subject of US forfeiture proceedings, with the US 
authorities viewing the proceeds as traceable to conduct carried out when 
the ambassador and his wife were stationed in the US.151
The SFO also deserves credit for its recognition of the overseas 
victims of the crime and the general societal damage that arises in cases 
of foreign bribery. There is, however, a risk in any foreign corruption case 
that the foreign of cials taking bribes are emblematic of a wider culture 
of corruption and cronyism within the foreign state. For this reason, there 
may be concerns in remitting funds to the government, with Chad, as a 
00144feabdc0> [perma.cc/3M6J-X498].
146. As recorded in Saleh (2015), supra note 141 at paras 112-113.
147. Ibid at para 53.
148. Saleh (2017), supra note 141 at paras 2, 6.
149. Saleh (2018), supra note 141.
150. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce, News Release, “SFO Recovers £4.4m from Corrupt 
Diplomats in ‘Chad Oil’ Deal” (22 March 2018), online: <www.sfo.gov.uk> [perma.cc/RA3N-
NM2D].
151. United States, Department of Justice, Press Release, 14-1240, “Department of Justice Seeks 
Recovery of Approximately $100,000 in Bribes Paid to Former Chad Ambassador” (7 November 
2014), online: <www.justice.gov> [perma.cc/95EJ-7VTX].
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pertinent example, having faced criticism for using its oil revenues to 
buy weapons rather than relieve poverty in the face of an agreement with 
the World Bank that oil royalties be used for development purposes.152
Balancing these considerations, the SFO directed the funds seized in the 
Chad Oil case to be transferred to the UK government’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) for investment in projects that “will 
bene t the poorest in Chad.”153
This example of creative sentencing parallels two other efforts where 
the SFO has facilitated the transfer back of con scated funds for the bene t 
of foreign victims of foreign bribery. Using the monies arising from the 
conviction of the security printing  rm, Smith and Ouzman Ltd., the SFO 
procured several new ambulances to service hospitals in Kenya, and it 
used its very  rst deferred prosecution agreement with Standard Bank Plc 
(now known as ICBC Standard Bank Plc) to direct GBP £4.9 million to the 
government of Tanzania.154 In a 2018 speech at an international symposium 
on economic crime delivered by the head of the SFO’s Proceeds of Crime 
and International Assistance Division, Elizabeth Baker made clear the 
SFO’s position that “[a]ll economic crime has victims,” even if “[t]heir 
identi cation may be more elusive.”155 She went on to state that “the ideal 
outcome, where-ever it is possible, is for the money secured through asset 
recovery to be returned to victims, using that term in its widest sense.”156
In supporting her argument with examples, she drew upon the cases of 
Chad Oil and Smith and Ouzman Ltd.
III. Comparative experience from the United Kingdom and Australia
Law enforcement authorities in the UK have also entered into an agreement 
to establish “a common framework to identify cases where compensation 
is appropriate” for victims of economic crime overseas and to “act swiftly 
in those cases to return funds to the affected countries, companies or 
152. See further Annalisa M Leibold, “Aligning Incentives for Development: The World Bank and the 
Chad-Cameron Oil Pipeline” (2011) 36:1 Yale J Intl L 167-206.
153. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce, News Release, supra note 150. See also Harrington, 
supra note 39 at 134, for the suggestion that “a seizing state may consider using the funds to support 
development projects and charities in the foreign state that have been vetted by its own development 
agency.”
154. These developments are highlighted by the SFO, supra note 150. Case information concerning 
Smith and Ouzman Ltd is available from the Serious Fraud Of ce at <www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/smith-
ouzman-ltd/> [perma.cc/57PN-J9CW]. Case information concerning Standard Bank Plc is available 
from the Serious Fraud Of ce at <www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/standard-bank-plc/> [perma.cc/MU2T-
NGL9].
155. Elizabeth Baker, “All Economic Crime has Victims” (Paper delivered at the Cambridge 
International Symposium on Economic Crime, Cambridge, 6 September 2018), online: Serious Fraud 
Of ce <www.sfo.gov.uk> [perma.cc/W3AK-2F3G].
156. Ibid.
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people.”157 The agreement concerns the Crown Prosecution Service, the 
National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Of ce. Launched as part of 
the UK’s Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2017–2022, the three departments 
have adopted a set of “General Principles” that make clear their “aim to 
ensure that overseas victims of bribery, corruption and economic crime, 
are able to bene t from asset recovery proceedings and compensation 
orders made in England and Wales,” with these victims to include 
“affected states, organizations and individuals. ”158 The over-arching 
strategy document also calls upon the UK to support other countries “to 
deliver their commitment to develop their own principles and continue to 
raise awareness internationally with the aim of achieving a consensus that 
overseas victims should bene t from the positive outcomes of bribery and 
corruption cases.”159
It is worth drawing attention to this development since Canada has 
opted for the English model of deferred prosecution agreements. There are 
two kinds of legal regimes that provide for deferred prosecution agreements. 
The United States has a policy-based regime, driven by the discretion of a 
prosecutor or a Securities and Exchange Commission of cial ,160 and with a 
fairly limited role for the courts,161 although legislation has been proposed 
since 2009 to provide for the issuance of public written guidelines.162
The impetus for the US policy favouring the use of deferred prosecution 
agreements to address the corporate commission of economic crime has 
been widely attributed to the 2002 criminal conviction of the now-defunct 
157. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce, News Release, “New Joint Principles Published to 
Compensate Victims of Economic Crime Overseas” (1 June 2018), online: <https://www.sfo.gov.
uk/2018/06/01/new-joint-principles-published-to-compensate-victims-of-economic-crime-overseas/> 
[perma.cc/Y2T5-S6JK].
158. United Kingdom, Crown Prosecution Service, “General Principles to Compensate Overseas 
Victims (Including Affected States) in Bribery, Corruption and Economic Crimes Cases” (December 
2017), online: Crown Prosecution Service <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/ les/documents/
publications/general-Principles-to-compensate-overseas-victims-December-2017.pdf> [perma.cc/
B4FE-QLNR].
159. United Kingdom Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017–2020 (2017), art 6.10, online (pdf): Government 
of the United Kingdom <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk> [perma.cc/ADP2-BPKC].
160. On the evolution of US policy towards the use of deferred prosecution agreements to address 
the corporate commission of foreign corruption, see Mike Koehler, “Measuring the Impact of Non-
Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement” 
(2015) 49:2 UC Davis L Rev 497.
161. For appellate af rmation of a limited judicial role in reviewing the terms of a US deferred 
prosecution agreement, see United States v Fokker Services BV, 818 F (3d) 733 at 744-745 (DC Cir 
2016). See also United States of America v HSBC Bank USA, NA, 863 F (3d) 125 (2d Cir 2017).
162. Entitled the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, the legislation has not been enacted into 
law. A recent effort was introduced in 2018 by US Senator Elizabeth Warren that would also mandate 
judicial oversight. See further Peter R Reilly, “Sweetheart Deals, Deferred Prosecution, and Making 
a Mockery of the Criminal Justice System: US Corporate DPAs Rejected on Many Fronts” (2018) 50 
Ariz St LJ 113 at 1160-1163.
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









Crimes and Courts Act 2013

 supra
 Arthur Andersen LLP v United States
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agreement was “a creature unknown to English law,” as explained in a 
recent parliamentary review of the sche me.172 English deferred prosecution 
agreements are also clearly intended to be discretionary tools, with only 
the director of public prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud 
Of ce having the power to authorize their negotiation with corporations, 
partnerships and unincorporated associations, but never individuals, in 
relation to fraud, bribery and other economic crimes.173 The courts have a 
role in approving and overseeing such agreements, and their terms are made 
public. The process and application criteria has also been made public, 
as is the Code of Practice describing how prosecutors will use this new 
tool.174 Criminal prosecution, however, continues to serve as a preferred 
course of action, with the entire scheme made subject to an overarching 
principle that deferred prosecution agreements are only offered in speci c 
circumstances, and in the interests of justice, based on an assessment of 
the evidence and the public interest.175 To date, four agreements have 
been concluded, with these agreements concerning Standard Bank 
(2015), Rolls Royce (2017), Tesco (2017), and a fourth company known 
as XYZ because it cannot be named until related criminal proceedings 
are concluded.176 The cases of Standard Bank, Rolls Royce, and XYZ are 
concerned with bribery offences, while the Tesco case involved charges of 
false accounting practices.
As for victims, the British legislation indicates that a deferred 
prosecution agreement can include an obligation “to compensate victims” 
or “to donate money to a charity or other third party.”177 Indeed, in the 
 rst agreement concluded under the new scheme, involving an indictment 
against Standard Bank Plc for failing to prevent associated persons from 
committing bribery, a term was included for the payment of compensation 
with interest to the government of Tanzania in the amount of USD $7 
million, in addition to the payment of a USD $16.8 million penalty, 
the disgorgement of pro ts in the amount of USD $8.6 million, and 
the payment of GBP £330,000 for the costs of the investigation.178 The 
(Commencement No 8) Order 2014 (UK), SI 2014/258.
172. See UK Select Committee on the Bribery Act, supra note 15 at 69.
173. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, supra note 166, Schedule 17, para 3.
174. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce and Crown Prosecution Service, “Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements: Code of Practice” (11 February 2014), online: Crown Prosecution Service <https://www.
cps.gov.uk/sites/default/ les/documents/publications/dpa_cop.pdf> [perma.cc/LQL5-VDBS].
175. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, supra note 166, Schedule 17 at ss 7(1)(a), 8(1)(a), 10(2)(a).
176. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements” (undated), 
online: <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/deferred-prosecution-
agreements/> [perma.cc/LBU8-QD8S].
177. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, supra note 166, Schedule 17 at ss 5(3)(b)-(c).
178. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce, News Release, “UK’s First Deferred Prosecution 
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agreement lasted for three years and when it expired on 30 November 
2018, the SFO issued a statement expressly con rming that the terms were 
met, with the payment of compensation to Tanzania made in May 2016. 
The SFO has also announced that it has been working with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Of ce, the Department of International Development and 
HM Treasury, as well as other UK organizations, “to develop a process for 
making similar compensation payments and other  nancial settlements to 
affected states in foreign bribery and international corruption cases safely 
and transparently.”179
The process of judicial approval for deferred prosecution agreements 
has also led to judicial guidance from the English courts with respect 
to providing compensation for victims. In his preliminary judgment 
concerning Standard Bank Plc, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, 
Sir Brian Leveson, made clear that in relation to corporate offenders, 
priority should be given to the payment of compensation to victims over 
 nes.180 However, the payment of compensation relies on an ability to 
positively identify an entity or person as a victim, as the English court has 
made clear in relation to the deferred prosecution agreements for XYZ and 
Rolls Royce .181 Sentencing guidelines and their associated jurisprudence 
have also made clear that compensation is for “clear and simple cases” and 
“there is no jurisdiction to make an order where there are real issues as to 
whether those to bene t have suffered any, and if so, what loss.”182 As a 
result, those who perpetrate the most complex foreign bribery schemes, 
perhaps involving multiple intermediaries, make it impossible to identify 
a quanti able loss arising from the criminal conduct, and can avoid having 
to pay compensation precisely because of that complexity.
Australia, meanwhile, introduced the possibility of deferred 
prosecution agreements in December 2017,183 following a more extensive 
consultation process than that used in Canada. In March 2016, the 
attorney-general’s department released a discussion paper on the possible 
Agreement, between the SFO and Standard Bank, Successfully Ends” (30 November 2018), online: 
<www.sfo.gov.uk>  [perma.cc/LBU8-QD8S].
179. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Of ce, “Case Information: Standard Bank Plc” (last updated 
3 September 2019), online: <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/standard-bank-plc/> [perma.cc/KBJ6-
JNND].
180. Serious Fraud Of ce v Standard Bank Plc, [2015] 11 WLUK 804 (Crown Court) at para 39.
181. Serious Fraud Of ce v XYZ Ltd, [2016] 7 WLUK 220 (Crown Court) at para 20; Serious Fraud 
Of ce v Rolls Royce Plc, supra note 137 at paras 81-84.
182. Serious Fraud Of ce v Rolls Royce Plc, supra note 181 at para 81.
183. Australia, Commonwealth Parliament, Parliamentary Library Bills Digest, Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crimes) Bill 2017 (Cth), by Cat Barker & Monica Biddington 
(2017) (introduced and read a  rst time).
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introduction of a scheme for deferred prosecution agreements ,184 and then 
in March 2017, the department initiated a second consultation for views 
on the law to be proposed.185 Then, after the relevant bill was introduced 
in parliament, a further consultation was undertaken with respect to a 
Code of Practice, with a draft being published in May 2018.186 However, 
contrary to the suggestion made in the ethics commissioner’s report,187
Australia’s scheme is not yet in place. The bill lapsed with the dissolution 
of the Commonwealth Parliament for a general election in mid-2019.
Assuming the law will be enacted in the near future, the Australian 
scheme intends to offer a corporation the deferment of a prosecution on 
foreign bribery and corruption charges, among other serious corporate 
crimes, in return for an obligation of cooperation with other investigations, 
the payment of a  nancial penalty, and the implementation of a program 
to improve compliance through ongoing monitoring. The terms of 
the agreement must be approved by a retired judge, due to Australian 
constitutional concerns having posed an obstacle to the use of a sitting 
judge. If the agreement is approved, no criminal proceedings are to be 
commenced, making the Australian scheme more akin to a non-prosecution 
agreement, with criminal proceedings commenced if the agreement is 
breached.188 During the consultation process, it was also suggested that 
the introduction of a deferred prosecution agreement scheme will “help 
to compensate victims of corporate crime,”189 with the attorney-general’s 
department having come to the view that “victim restitution is a key 
feature of the US and UK schemes.”190 The proposed Australian scheme 
also follows the lead of the English scheme by providing for the payment 
of a donation to a charity or third party as an obligation within an approved 
agreement.
184. Australia, Commonwealth Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements: Public Consultation (March 2016) [Australia 2016 Discussion Paper].
185. Australia, Commonwealth Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Public 
Consultation: Proposed Model for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement Scheme in Australia (March 
2017), online: Government of Australia <www.ag.gov.au> [perma.cc/YC8U-SGRS].
186. Australia, Commonwealth Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement Scheme Code of Practice: Consultation Draft (May 2018), online (pdf): Government of 
Australia <www.ag.gov.au> [perma.cc/DMH8-UZ6T].
187. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 25.
188. This point is made in a critique of the proposed Australian scheme in Liz Campbell, “Trying 
Corporate Actors—Why Not Prosecute?” (8 February 2019) at 17, online: Social Sciences Research 
Network <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3332134> [perma.cc/X64E-V4UE].
189. Australia 2016 Discussion Paper, supra note 184 at 3.
190. Ibid at 20.
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IV. Creating a remediation fund similar to the Environmental Damages 
Fund
One last option for future consideration is the creation of a designated fund 
to which some portion of the penalties for foreign corruption could be 
directed to provide  nancial support for development assistance projects 
aimed at the remediation of the general societal impact of foreign bribery. 
Such a fund could use the federally-created Environmental Damages Fund 
(EDF) as a model and precedent.191 Established in 1995, not by statute or 
regulation, but by a Treasury Board decisio n,192 and administered by the 
federal department of the environment (known colloquially as Environment 
and Climate Change Canada),193 the EDF serves as a concrete expression 
of the polluter-pays principle in international environmental law, whereby 
those who pollute are required to pay for the economic, environmental 
and social consequences of their activities.194 The EDF is a “speci ed 
purpose account” within the accounts of Canada,195 into which are 
deposited monies obtained from court orders, negotiated settlements and 
voluntary payments relating to the commission of environmental offences 
under federal statutes such as the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
1999.196 Monies can also be directed to the EDF from what are called 
Environmental Protection Alternative Measures (EPAMs), which stand 
as an environmental law equivalent to the above-discussed remediation 
agreements for economic crimes.197 Payments have also been directed to 
the EDF in cases where direct damage has been dif cult to identify, as 
with the illegal importation of an ozone-depleting substance, and where 
191. See generally “Environmental Damages Fund” (15 November 2018), online: Government of 
Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-funding/
programs/environmental-damages-fund.html> [perma.cc/9S5N-6E9J].
192. Harry J Wruck, “The Federal Environmental Damages Fund” (2004) 62:2 Advocate 217 at 221. 
For the legal authority, see the Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11.
193. Department of the Environment Act, RSC 1985, c E-10.
194. See Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/
CONF.151/26 (Vol I) at Annex I (1992); see also Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell, 
International Law and the Environment, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 322-326. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has con rmed that “the principle has become  rmly entrenched in 
environmental law in Canada”: Imperial Oil v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 at 
paras 23-24.
195. Government of Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, “Directive on Accounting Standards: GC 
4100 Speci ed Purpose Accounts” (1 April 2017), online: <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.
aspx?id=32524> [perma.cc/S5LL-VGUK].
196. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33.
197. See further Government of Canada, Environment Canada, “Environmental Protection: 
Alternatives to Legal Prosecution” (28 November 2019), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/
environment-climate-change/services/canadian-environmental-protection-act-registry/enforcement-
compliance/alternatives-legal-prosecution.html> [perma.cc/AYV7-6A2E].
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harm is assumed to  ow from an illegality committed in a foreign state, as 
with the importation of elephant ivory into Canada.198
The EDF assists with remediation through the provision of awards 
in support of projects aimed at environmental rehabilitation and wildlife 
conservation, with applications made by non-governmental organizations, 
universities and academic institutions, Indigenous organizations, and 
provincial, territorial and municipal governments. According to a 2014 
evaluation, the EDF had allocated or committed over CAD $4.8 million 
since 1998, and funded 201 projects across Canada .199 To receive funding, 
a proposed project must focus on one or more of the Fund’s designated 
priority areas, being environmental restoration, environmental quality 
improvement, research and development, and education and awareness. 
Projects which focus on the geographic region where the offence occurred 
are also given priority, with the EDF also obliged to respect any restrictions 
imposed by the courts concerning the monies. Sub-accounts are established 
within the EDF to meet any conditions speci ed by a court and to allocate 
monies to address particular incidents. The terms of the EDF also spell out 
what is ineligible for support, and they require that funded projects make 
use of performance indicators to evaluate outcomes. Projects are selected 
for funding by department experts through an evaluation process that is 
similar to that used for the allocation of research grants and scholarships 
from public funds.
By its terms, the EDF cannot be used to fund projects outside of 
Canada. This restriction is the choice of the fund’s creators, and does 
not bar the creation of a similar fund to support development assistance 
projects overseas, using a portion of the  nancial penalties paid by 
Canadian companies (and possibly, individuals) for the commission 
of foreign bribery. Instead of requirements to demonstrate scienti c 
feasibility, the terms of this proposed development assistance fund could 
require applicants to work with Canada’s international development 
ministry,200 so as to minimize the risk of monies being injected back into 
corrupt government schemes, and in partnership with a local community 
in the foreign country, so as to ensure that the latter has a role in designing 
198. See Wruck, supra note 192 at 229.
199. Government of Canada, Environment Canada, Audit and Evaluation Branch, Evaluation of 
the Environmental Damages Fund: Final Report (October 2014) at i, online (pdf): <https://www.
ec.gc.ca/ae-ve/23D3C410-CDE9-46F9-AD2E-055551B883FE/Evaluation%20of%20the%20
Environmental%20Damages%20Fund%20(EDF).pdf> [perma.cc/F6VM-SU3Y].
200. With statutory responsibilities for international development, poverty reduction and humanitarian 
assistance, Canada’s Minister for International Development operates within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development (known colloquially as Global Affairs Canada). 
See Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, SC 2013, c 33, s 174 at s 4.
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and implementing the remediation project. Indeed, in light of Canada’s 
experience with the EDF, the larger obstacle to overcome may be the need 
for publicity about this sentencing option, with greater awareness needed 
among both lawyers and judges so to ensure that some portion of the 
penalties are diverted to such a fund.201
Conclusion
There needs to be greater clarity as to the place for victims within the 
criminal law scheme for addressing the corruption of foreign public 
of cials, whether the crime is committed by corporations or individuals. 
Given the crime’s inherent transnational nature, there may well be victims 
in both Canada and overseas, with Canada’s justice system having long 
accepted that corruption is neither harmless nor victimless. Since the 
mid-1980s, greater attention has also been paid to the impact of crime on 
victims, leading to the adoption of an international declaration of basic 
principles in 1985 .202 According to this declaration, victims of crime are 
entitled “to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the 
harm that they have suffered,” and “offenders…should, where appropriate, 
make fair restitution to victims.”203 To give effect to the 1985 declaration, 
states are encouraged to cooperate with each other in such matters as 
“the pursuit of offenders” and “the seizure of their assets, to be used for 
restitution to the victim.”204 The UK’s Serious Fraud Of ce appears to 
be heeding this call in the corruption context, having developed public 
statements of principle that recognize the need to use the millions paid 
in  nes to assist overseas victims, even if its initial efforts to put these 
principles into practice through the provision of ambulances for Kenya 
may seem so random as to provide little precedential guidance.205
There remains, however, the dif cult issue of de ning a victim in the 
foreign corruption context, with the SNC-Lavalin affair having repeatedly 
raised issues of victimhood in public discussions.206 The victims most often 
201. See further Government of Canada, Environment Canada, Audit and Evaluation Branch, 
Evaluation of the Environmental Damages Fund (July 2009), online: <https://www.ec.gc.ca/ae-ve/
default.asp?lang=En&n=4DBC464A-1> [perma.cc/BP8V-XHTL]; Evaluation of the Environmental 
Damages Fund: Final Report, supra note 199.
202. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN GA Res 
40/34, UN Doc A/RES/40/34 (1985) at para 1 [Victims of Crime Declaration].
203. Ibid, Annex at paras 4, 8.
204. Ibid at para 4(h).
205. I remain grateful to Professor Cecily Rose of Leiden University for this insight.
206. There has been no mention in the media coverage concerning the SNC-Lavalin plea deal reached 
in December 2019 as to whether the  ne of CAD $280-million includes some form of payment for 
victims. SNC-Lavalin had earlier indicated a “willingness to provide further information” concerning 
the negotiation of reparations to victims: SNC-Lavalin v Canada 2019, supra note 17 at para 13.
Providing for Victim Redress within the Legislative Scheme 279
for Tackling Foreign Corruption
mentioned were the company’s employees, pensioners and suppliers, as 
well as its shareholders and investors. Under the 1985 UN Declaration, 
victims are de ned as “persons who, individually or collectively, have 
suffered harm,” with the Declaration also making clear that “a person may 
be considered a victim…regardless of whether the perpetrator is identi ed, 
apprehended, prosecuted or convicted.”207 However, for victim redress to 
be secured through compensation or restitution, speci city is needed as to 
a victim’s identity and the quanti cation of their loss, with a causal link 
to be established between the victim and the criminal conduct. Given the 
dif culty in establishing this degree of speci city, another option may be 
to abandon any de nitional effort, and instead provide for victim redress 
in foreign corruption cases through efforts of a collective nature, aimed 
at addressing general societal needs, with the  exibility of negotiated 
agreements, whether plea deals or remediation agreements, offering the 
best prospects for securing some diversion of the  nes to be paid by 
corporate wrongdoers.
For many, society as a whole, or society as a whole within the 
foreign state, is seen as the victim in a foreign corruption case, with the 
development imperative for tackling foreign bribery and corruption having 
been embraced by the Supreme Court of Canada in the opening words of 
its judgment in World Bank Group v Wallace.208 Many may also recognize 
grand corruption’s wider connection to the breakdown of the rule of 
law and the sense of impunity that can contribute to the commission of 
international crimes, with Libya being a cogent example. For this reason, 
victim redress in the form of redirecting some of the millions paid in 
corporate  nes to an appropriate charity or an international development 
agency for the provision of public services in the affected foreign country 
is the best route forward, with the general principles on compensating 
the overseas victims of economic crime adopted by the law enforcement 
authorities in England and Wales offering a model for Canada to consider 
further.209 The time is also ripe for a parliamentary review of the CFPOA, 
with Canada’s peer jurisdictions having already engaged in a parliamentary 
review of their Act’s record of success and failings.210 In addition, 
Canada’s implementation of its obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, including article 5, is scheduled for a peer review before the 
207. Victims of Crime Declaration, supra note 202, Annex at paras 1 & 2.
208. World Bank Group v Wallace, supra note 30 at para 1.
209. See United Kingdom, Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 158.
210. Australia, Commonwealth Parliament, Senate, Economics References Committee, Foreign 
Bribery (March 2018) (Chair: Chris Ketter); UK Select Committee on the Bribery Act, supra note 15.
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OECD Working Group on Bribery in 2020.211 A review of the CFPOA, as 
now amended by the remediation agreement scheme, could also consider 
further the idea of creating a corruption remediation and development 
assistance fund, akin to Canada’s Environmental Damages Fund, for the 
collection and distribution of a portion of the  nancial penalties paid in 
settlement of foreign corruption charges to provide support for worthy 
projects.
211. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Monitoring Schedule: December 2016–June 2024, (undated), 
online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/55RD-QHDH]. Launched at the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Ministerial Meeting held in Paris on 18 March 2016, the fourth phase of the Convention’s peer review 
monitoring process aims to focus on enforcement efforts and results.
